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Forum Juridicum
JURIDICAL LEGISLATION*
GEORGE

W.

HARDY, JR.t

When two of the justices of the highest Court of our country
view the present trend of rulings by their Court as tending to
make the law a game of chance rather than a chart for governing conduct;1 when these distinguished jurists declare "defendants
will not know whether to litigate or to settle for they will have
no assurance that a declared rule will be followed; 2 when one of
these same justices caustically describes the tendency of the Court
as one calculated to bring adjudications into the same class as a
restricted railroad ticket, good for this day and train only;3 when
decisions of the Court once marked by the preponderance of an
august and respect compelling unanimity of opinion are now
punctuated not infrequently by one or more dissenting opinions,
and even one or more concurring opinions; when two justices of
the majority join in writing a concurring opinion for the sole and
only purpose of criticizing the dissent of another justice;4 when
opinions are so argumentative as to more resemble advocates'
briefs than judicial pronouncements; when all these things have
come to pass, there is small wonder that the conditions which
have resulted are become matters of discussion not only among
members of the profession, but subject, indeed, for widespread
newspaper comment and radio forums.
The vast feeling of uncertainty which pervades the minds of
all members of both bench and bar, federal and state, has indeed
become a matter of concern. There is a rather widespread inclination to fix the blame, if any blame be attached, upon a tendency
of our courts to overstep the constitutional bounds determining
* An address delivered at a meeting of the Bar Association of the Fourth
Judicial District, Monroe, Louisiana, June 12, 1945.
tJudge, Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, State of Louisiana.
1. Mahnich v. Southern Steamship Co., 321 U.S. 96, 64 S.Ct. 455, 88 L.Ed.
561 (1944), dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts joined in by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter.
2. Ibid.
3. Dissent of Mr. Justice Roberts in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 64
S.Ct. 757, 88 L.Ed. 987 (1944).
4. Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 590, 64
S.Ct. 281, 88 L.Ed. 333 (1944), special concurring opinion of Justices Black and
Murphy.
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the separation of branches of our government. In other words,
both lawyers and laymen are using and abusing the phrase,
"judicial legislation."
Is it indeed true that 'our courts, through their judgments,
are willfully crossing the line of demarcation and trespassing in
fields of legislation and administration from which they have
been fenced by constitutional barriers? Or it is rather evident
that our courts have reached the point where the clean and obvious cleavage between branches has been so blurred that they
have unintentionally strayed into what is now a twilight zone, a
no-man's land between the non-political judicial and the political
legislative and executive branches of government? Or is it reasonable to conclude that the complexities of modern times, the
stepped-up pressure of life itself, the revolutionary changes in
social, economic and political relationships have necessitated a
relaxation in the observance of what once were clearly marked
and easily ascertained boundary lines?
These are obviously both proper and timely questions for
discussion, and since a resolution of these matters so vitally
affects the people of the entire nation, and so essentially depends
upon the will of that people, it is both just and fitting that such
a resolution be based not alone upon the results of professional
analysis, but rather upon such an analysis made in the light of
both the public need and the public will.
The comment of Justice Holmes, "Judges do and must legislate,"5 is frequently quoted. But, there is an earlier declaration
by the same author made before he became a judge, "...
in
substance the growth of the law is legislative. '6
Quite possibly the change in point of view which occurs to
one who has left the bar and assumed the duties of the bench is
due more to lessons learned by experience than to inconsistency
of thought. The Yankee from Olympus was not immune to such
a change, and his expression with reference to legislation by the
judges is only one of many such expressions, the most notable
and emphatic, perhaps, being the one of Charles Evan Hughes
who declared that the Constitution is "what the judges say it is.' 7
As a matter of fact, we have all accepted the inescapable conclusion that courts do legislate, but for generations we have re-mained undisturbed by this knowledge because such legislation
5. Dissenting opinion in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221,
57 S.Ct. 524, 531, 61 L.Ed. 1086, 1100 (1917).
6. Holmes, Common Law (1881).
7. Charles Evan Hughes Addresses, 139.
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has been carefully confined to more or less explicable and understandable types and phases of statutory law. But, now, we are
asking ourselves, and others, "Have our courts gone too far,
have they departed from the traditional form and character of
judicial legislation, and are they now, under the guise of interpretation and through the use of the principles of legislative
intent and public policy, infiltrating through the ramparts of
constitutional defenses?"
It was Judge Walter Clark of North Carolina who well
expressed this danger in these words:
"Whatever tends to increase the power of the judiciary over
the legislature diminishes the control of the people over their
government, negatives the free expression of their will, is in
conflict with the spirit and express letter of the organic law,
and opposed to the manifest movement of the age."
Most certainly, every member of every court in the land
would deny the imputation that is implicit in the question we
have phrased above. But, it is still possible that courts have
been gently led into error through their own well-intentioned
desire simply to aid and assist congressional and legislative efforts
to conform to the' needs of a rapidly changing and increasingly
complex social and economic ideology.
In an address delivered last year at the annual meeting of
the American Law Institute in Philadelphia, 8 Justice Robert H.
Jackson recognized the decline of the principle of stare decisis:
"We may also agree, I am sure, that our times have witnessed
considerable relaxation in the authority of the precedent." "... no

lawyer today feels such assurance that a pat case will bring him
victory or defeat as lawyers once felt."
For the existence of the conditions which he decried, Mr.
Justice Jackson blamed an increased pace and pressure; remarked
upon the enormous multiplication of precedents; noted the increase during the past century in numbers of courts of last
resort, of intermediate courts of appeal, and of various specialized tribunals, acknowledged his own inability to absorb the
output, and reached a rather discouraging conclusion on this
particular point, which he expressed as follows:
"Legal opinions seem subject to the same natural law that
affects currency; inflation of the volume decreases the value
8. Jackson, The Decline of Stare Decisis (1944) 28 J. Am. Jud. Soc. 6-7.
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of each unit. When so many issues of opinion compete for
acceptance, they inevitably suffer a discount.
"But the increased volume of opinion affects the intrinsic
value of many precedents as well. They are made of baser
metals when the pace is fast and the volume large."9
It would seem that the logic of this development of cause
and effect is somewhat open to criticism. An increase in number
of tribunals devoted to the interpretation of law ought to
lighten the burden, and that it would lighten the burden would
not be open to question if it could be assumed that these tribunals
could rely upon the authority of established principles as enunciated by our highest courts, both state and federal. But the
feeling of uncertainty has permeated from the top stratum of
judicial authority down through the succession of lower tribunals,
until there remains only a sense of perplexity, an atmosphere of
confusion. An apt illustration in support of this observation is
found in the recent case of Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. Charles
J. McLaughlin,10 which originated in Connecticut and was considered on appeal from the Federal District Court by the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.1 ' The opinion
of the majority of the court indicated that, because of the recent
trend of decisions of the Supreme Court, it was justified in
assuming jurisdiction and passing upon the matter. Justice Hand,
in a pithy opinion, summed up his dissent in this manner:
"Nor is it desirable for a lower court to embrace the exhilarating opportunity of anticipating a doctrine which may be in
the womb of time, but whose birth is distant."'12
The Supreme Court, with one justice concurring in the
result and one justice dissenting, vacated the judgment of the
court of appeals and remanded the case to the district court with
directions that the bill be retained pending the determination of
proceedings to be brought with reasonable promptitude in the
state court.
Thus, we see that courts have joined the lawyers in fascinating but fruitless participation in a game of guesswork.
Many of the inconsistencies evident in recent jurisprudence
have undoubtedly resulted from the over-emphasis which courts
have placed upon the "intent" principle of construction. As a
9. Id. at 7.
10. 323 U.S. 101, 89 L.Ed. 105 (1944).
11. 139 F.(2d) 809 (1943).
12. Id. at 823.
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rule the interpretation of recently enacted legislation presents
no grave difficulties. In spite of the increased pressure, pace and
volume of litigation to which reference was made by Justice
Jackson, the members of courts, in most instances, manage to
keep abreast of current events, of the needs, the underlying
reasons and the supporting principles of the more important
phases of legislation. In addition to this feature, which may be
classified under "matters of common knowledge," there is opportunity for presentation of data for the guidance of a court in
determining intents, which is extremely Valuable and important
as an aid to final determination.
But, it is in the interpretation of legislation adopted years,
decades or even generations since that the greatest difficulties are
presented. In what is undoubtedly, at times, a strained and
unnatural effort to ascribe certain intents to this character of
legislation, to conform what a court regards as legislative "intent"
to modem social and economic concepts, courts unquestionably
fall into error. The very debates and committee hearings of
legislative bodies on these subjects are not reliable guides, and
due to the lapse of time there is a correspondingly greater
margin for error in the conclusions reached.
The changes and departures from precedent which demand
our attention might have been absorbed without any noticeable
jar to our established concepts of jurisprudence if they had
evolved over a period of time. However, they have not taken
place in the luxury of leisure, but have developed in the comparatively short period of a decade, progressively increasing.
over this period in tempo and in multiplicity until we have
become bewildered and confused.
The excellent permanent edition of "Words and Phrases,"
printed in 1940, which is represented as covering judicial constructions and definitions "from the earliest times," contains 162
citations under the phrase Public Policy. Reference to the supplement covering matters under the same heading in the period
1940-1944, inclusive, discloses approximately 550 citations. It
cannot be contended that matters of public policy of our nation
have grown at such an astounding rate as to explain this tremendous increase. But, it is true that more matters touching
public policy are comprehended in our statutes, and more and
more the effect of legislation upon public policy is being considered by courts with reference to both old and new legislation.
In pursuit of the will-o'-the wisp of public policy, courts
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sometimes lose themselves in a maze of theories when adherence
to practical considerations might lead unerringly to more reasonable and beneficial conclusions. In McNabb v. United States,13
the Supreme Court evolved a new rule, and excluded evidence
consisting of information elicted from suspected murderers between the time of arrest and their production before a committing magistrate, a procedure required by formalities of law. The
Court made no pretension that the admissions from the suspects
had resulted from any sort of coercion, nor did the Court find
any violation of constitutional provisions, but, apparently, in its
zeal and excess of interest in the protection of individual rights,
it produced a judgment which has been severely criticized as
contrary to public welfare. The news carried by this morning's
press of the Supreme Court5s decision setting aside the conviction of the German bundists, though the text of the Court's opinion is not yet in hand, would indicate a continuance of the Court's
policy in the direction fixed by the McNabb doctrine.
It should be borne in mind that it is not in any sense the
duty of a court to make policy, and when, even in well-intentioned instances, it so far departs from the traditionally accepted
and constitutionally defined functions of a court as to engraft the
ideas of its members, as to what they think should be policy,
onto the trunk of the body politic, such action indubitably subjects the court not only to sharp criticism, but diminishes the
respect of the general public, a respect heretofore approaching
reverence, in which it has been held.
As to the influence of the adjudications of federal courts
upon state tribunals, it must be remembered that the public policy of the United States, or, should we say, interpretations of the
public policy of the United States as given by federal courts,
are not necessarily controlling on matters which concern the
internal policies of the several states. There are numerous instances where state courts have refused to follow pronouncements of public policy by the federal judiciary, and these actions
are not only justifiable but eminently proper. Public policies of
the State of Louisiana, for example, need not necessarily accord
with public policies of our federal government any more than
they need accord with the public policies of other states. For
this reason doctrines advanced by the federal judiciary affecting
such matters of policy, unless there is an underlying basis involv13. 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819 (1943).
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ing constitutional rights, are neither controlling nor necessarily
persuasive.
Courts cannot by judicial pronouncements remedy all the
injustices, inequities and inequalities which result from even the
wisest and most meticulously prepared statutory enactments. In
literally hundreds of cases we find the declarations made by the
courts themselves that they are not responsible for, nor is it
within their province to rule upon, the wisdom, vel non, of legislative enactments. Courts can, with propriety, and, in my opinion, should point out defects in legislation and suggest corrective
and remedial measures for the consideration of legislative bodies.
But action beyond this, on such matters, unquestionably goes
beyond the true purpose of the judicial function.
It should be definitely understood that these observations
are not intended, and should not under any circumstances be
construed, as advocating the binding of the judiciary by technical rules or the circumscribing of its true functions by the application of artificial, antiquated and obsolete precedents, which
should be more honored in the breach than in the observance.
But, it is emphatically intended to convey the idea that courts
must steadfastly resist the very real temptation to project judicial authority across the lines which mark the limits of their
powers, obligations and responsibilities under the clear provisions
of constitutional limitations.
The effect of this tendency to pursue legislative intent, and
in effect to rewrite statutes by changing the plain and unambiguous meaning of words used in the statute, is not confined to
our federal courts, for the trend is increasingly evident in the
opinions of state courts. Specifically, in our own state we find
that the opinion of the supreme court in Thornton v. E. I. Dupont
4 was predicated upon an interpretade Nemours & Company,"
tion by the Court to the effect that the words "maximum percent
of wages" in subd. 1 (B) of Section 18 of Act 20 of 1914, as
amended, 15 were intended to mean "maximum compensation."
Upon this ground the court reversed the judgment of the district
court, which had been affirmed by the Court of Appeal for the
First Circuit, maintaining a plea of prematurity and dismissing
the suit of a plaintiff who had been paid by the employer since
his injury, not the maximum amount of compensation of $20.00
per week, but his regular weekly wage of $55.00. Upon the filing
14. 207 La. 239, 21 So.(2d) 46 (1944).
15. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4408.
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of suit, the employer discharged the employee, removed him
from the payroll and placed him on workman's compensation at
the rate of $20.00 per week during the period of disability. Two
justices concurred in the opinion of the majority, one of them
writing a separate concurring opinion, and two justices dissented,
one of them, Judge Rogers, writing a dissenting opinion, in which
he expressed a very pertinent fear as to the effect of the majority
opinion, as follows:
"I fear that the decision in this case holding that an employee may obtain a judgment against his employer as soon
as an injury is suffered, even though there is no dispute as
to the amount due as compensation, and even though the
employee is receiving his full wages, will result in employers
feeling compelled to immediately discharged their injured
employees and to put them on compensation, thereby putting
an end to the practice followed by many employers, particularly those who carry their own liability insurance, of assistthe
ing those of th.eir employees who are injured during
16
course of their employment in regaining their health.

It would seem that both public policy and the intent of the
legislature as expressed by the "liberal construction" policy, in
the best interest of the employee, would have indicated a holding
that the word "wages" as used by the legislature in the act itself,
should be construed as meaning "wages"!
In the recent, and as yet unpublished opinion of the supreme
court in the case of Clara Thompson, Tutrix v. Vestal Lumber &
Manufacturing Company," the court held the definition fixed in
paragraph (H), subsection (2), of Section 8 of the Employers
Liability Act, as amended:
"The term 'child' or 'children' shall cover only legitimate
children, step-children, posthumous children, adopted children
and illegitimate children acknowledged under the provisions
of Civil Code Articles 203, 204 and 205,"18

as being inapplicable to an action by illegitimate children.
The cited case was brought by the mother of two minor children claiming damages under Article 2315 of the Civil Code, and,
alternatively, compensation for the death of their father. The
16. 207 La. 239, 21 So.(2d) 46, 60 (1944).
17. 22 So. (2d) 842 (La. 1945).
18. La. Act 20 of 1914, as amended [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 43981.
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petition set forth that the petitioner and the decedent, the father
of the children, had lived together in open concubinage or common law marriage, of which union the two children were born;
that the said children were the illegitimate children of the deceased employee, never acknowledged by him by notarial act,
but living with him in the same house and dependent upon him
for support. Exceptions of no cause or right of action were sustained by the district court, which judgment was affirmed by
the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit. Writs were granted by the
supreme court and on the original hearing the judgment of the
court of appeal was affirmed. From this judgment the chief justice and two of the associate justices dissented, one of the justices
filing a dissenting opinion. A rehearing was granted, and on
rehearing there was judgment annulling the judgment of the district court as affirmed by the court of appeal, overruling the exception of no cause or right of action and remanding the case for
further procedure. The right of action for damages under Civil
Code Article 2315 was denied. The opinion, in which all members
of the court concurred, distinguished a number of cases in which
recovery had been denied to illegitimate children, and, by implication at least, squarely overruled the holding in Beard v. Rickert
Rice Mills.19
The effect of the holding in the Thtompson case is that, for the
present, at least, dependent illegitimate offspring are not barred
from recovery of compensation on account of the death of a parent, provided they were actually living under the same roof in the
sense of constituting a part of the family of the decedent.
This holding can be, and is, justified only on the ground of
public policy, and likely is in accord with those social plans which,
to use the words of the dissenting opinion on original hearing of
the case, would pass on to industry, and ultimately to the public,
the compensation provided for in the act, and thereby eliminate
the likelihood of leaving illegitimate children to shift for themselves or to become public charges.
But, however much we may agree with the broad social principle involved and with the effect of interpretation accorded, this
decision squarely poses one of the important questions involved
in our discussion. To what extent are courts at liberty to go in
conforming to currently accepted social and economic trends of
thought when such conformance necessitates a so-called "interpretation" of unambiguous definitions, terms and provisions of
19. 185 La. 55, 168 So. 492 (1936).
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statutes? Should courts so pursue a predilection in this direction
as might bring them in conflict with certain well-established,
cardinal principles of constitutional law? These principles have
become so firmly imbedded in both our federal and state jurisprudence that no court would consider directly countenancing their
breach. It is regarded as fundamental that courts will not disregard the letter of a law under the pretext of pursuing its spirit,
that construction may not be substituted for legislation, that interpretation shall not go beyond the domain of ambiguity. And
there is still a further rule of construction, sanctioned by long tradition, enunciated and reiterated in a long line of cases, that after
a statute has been judicially construed, such construction with
regard to contract rights, is regarded as becoming a part of the
statute itself. The corollary of this proposition is that a change of
such construction affects contracts in the same manner and to the
same degree as a legislative amendment of the statute. It is this
fundamental conception of judicial interpretation upon which
lawyers have so long relied in advising clients as to their rights
or liabilities. The theory which supports the rule is obvious. It is
not the function of courts nor judges to assume the burden of
political considerations. Fundamentally, in our scheme of government, the judiciary is nonpolitical. In theory, conformation to
trends and changes in public needs and desires is left to the legislative and administrative branches of government, and, unquestionably, these branches bear the obligation of responding through
appropriate legislation to current public sentiment. It is for courts
to reconcile political legislation with broad principles of justice
and equity whenever such reconciliation is possible and compatible with recognized and accepted ideals and principles. The "takea-chance" doctrine is incompatible with the principle of steadfast
adherence to fundamentals. Weathervane fluctuations in opinion
are abhorrent to all conceptions of judicial conduct.
It has not been the purpose of this discussion to offer any
panacea for the ills and aches which appear to be afflicting both
lawyers and judges, but it has been its intent to present frankly
the questions that must and unquestionably will be answered in
due course of time.
And, finally, by way of conclusion, we come to the subject of
this address. This subject has been chosen by design to point a
distinction between the idea of judicial legislation, which in one
sense at least, connotes the unauthorized making of law by judges
and courts, and juridical legislation,which is conceived to be that
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desirable and enduring contribution, through and by a well-considered and established jurisprudence, to the great body of constitutional law.
Perhaps small consolation is offered in time of distress by the
observation that all this will pass, but by experience we know it
to be true. The disaffections and uncertainties engendered by
"judicial legislation" will not last. The unrest attendant upon the
cataclysmic effects of a world at war, the period of change, of
adjustments, all this will pass away, and in the near future, or so
we hope, will remain in our minds only as little memories of little
troubles.
One swallow does not make a summer, nor does one case
necessarily establish a precedent, though it may have overturned
one. It may be under new statutes of Congress, new acts of the
legislature, which seek to remake the scheme of things nearer to
our heart's desire; it may be through or by a combination of any
number of things which shall come to pass that order and certainty will re restored. The means and instrumentalities may not
yet be plain. But of one thing we are assured, one certainty remains, even in the midst of uncertainty,-our faith in the democratic processes of government and in the laws which assure
the protection and continued existence of these processes.
And, meanwhile, perhaps it may be well for judges to adopt
the advice of Pope, although the advice was given with reference
to another subject:
"Be not the first by whom the new is tried,
Nor yet the last to lay the old aside."

